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Recent works suggest that pooling and sharing may constitute a fundamental mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation in well-mixed fluctuating environments. The rationale is that, by reducing
the amplitude of fluctuations, pooling and sharing increases the steady-state growth rate at which
individuals self-reproduce. However, in reality interactions are seldom realized in a well-mixed struc-
ture, and the underlying topology is in general described by a complex network. Motivated by this
observation, we investigate the role of the network structure on the cooperative dynamics in fluctuat-
ing environments, by developing a model for networked pooling and sharing of resources undergoing
a geometric Brownian motion. The study reveals that, while in general cooperation increases the
individual steady state growth rates (i.e. is evolutionary advantageous), the interplay with the net-
work structure may yield large discrepancies in the observed individual resource endowments. We
comment possible biological and social implications and discuss relations to econophysics.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Ey, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation has played a fundamental role in the evo-
lution of systems consisting of individuals with different
levels of complexity, ranging from simple cell to complex
human behavior [1]. However, natural selection imposes
competition and thus the emergence of cooperation is
predicated on the co-occurrence of a specific mechanism
within the studied network of contacts [2].
A standard approach for examining the effect of differ-
ent mechanisms on the cooperation dynamics in complex
networks is through evolutionary graph theory [3]. Un-
der this setting, the individuals interacting in a network
are given a set of strategies which they can choose from,
and a set of payoffs (changes in the individual resource
endowment) that result from interactions with other in-
dividuals and their chosen strategies. In the simplest
situation, each individual can either be a cooperator or
a defector. A cooperator is someone who sacrifices its
own resources in order to achieve a better collective per-
formance, whereas defectors are individuals who exploit
this cooperative behavior.
Since the pioneering works of Axelrod [1], and later
Nowak et al. [2, 4–6], on matrix games, i.e. pairwise in-
teractions between individuals, a lot of effort has been
put into uncovering the mechanisms required for coop-
erators to survive the invasion of defectors in networked
∗ vstojkoski@manu.edu.mk
societies. In particular, more general forms of interaction
structures which capture group interactions have been
discussed in [7–9]. In this context, it has been found
that the introduction of spatial randomness represented
by heterogeneous resource endowments between individ-
uals may unconditionally facilitate the evolution of coop-
eration [10, 11].
Despite the abundance of studies which capture such
spatial stochasticity, a ubiquitous, yet largely unex-
plored scenario remains the one of cooperative interac-
tions on complex networks in fluctuating environments –
where the temporal evolution of resource endowments is
strongly affected by their relative growth. In such sit-
uations, fluctuations have a net-negative effect on the
time-averages, although having no effect on the ensem-
ble (spatial) properties [12]. This observation, which is a
result of the non-ergodicity of the fluctuation-generating
process [12, 13], yields evolutionary behavior which es-
sentially differs from the one observed in standard mod-
els [14, 15].
On this basis, it has been hypothesized that repeated
pooling and sharing of resources which previously exhibit
a fluctuating growth may constitute a fundamental mech-
anism for the evolution of cooperation in a well-mixed
population. The rationale is that, by reducing the am-
plitude of fluctuations, pooling and sharing increases the
steady state growth rate at which the individual coop-
erating entities self-reproduce [16–18]. A crucial real-life
observation is, however, that interactions between indi-
viduals are seldom realized in a well-mixed structure, and
they are instead driven by a complex network of con-
2tacts [6].
Motivated by this observation, here we investigate the
impact the complex network topology on the cooperative
dynamics in fluctuating environments, with networked
individuals performing pooling and sharing of resources
undergoing a geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). The
noisy resource growth produced by GBM is a common
model for fluctuations [15, 19, 20]. The interactions
are modeled by considering each individual to also be a
pool through which its (direct) neighbors share resources.
The model is evaluated analytically and numerically on
four types of random graphs: random d-regular graph
(RR) [21], Erdos-Renyi Poisson graph (ER) [22], Watts-
Strogatz small-world network (WS) [23] and Barabasi-
Albert scale-free network (BA) [24]. Our findings suggest
that, while there remains the general trend that cooper-
ation increases the steady state growth rate of each in-
dividual (i.e. is evolutionary advantageous), the unique
interplay between the non-ergodic fluctuation-generating
process and the network topology may generate large dis-
crepancies in the resource endowments. When present,
this inequality has a negative effect on the growth rates
of the individual entities, hampering their evolutionary
performance. Parallels can be made to current societal
discussions on wealth inequality [25].
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II, we describe the system model by providing
details about the pooling and sharing mechanism, the
networked interactions, and the properties of GBM. In
Section III we provide analytical results for the growth
rate and the steady state behavior of the individual re-
source endowments. In Section IV we perform numerical
experiments and comparison with the analytical results
derived in the previous section. Finally, in Section V we
discuss our findings and give directions for future work.
Some additional technical details are provided in the Ap-
pendix.
II. MODEL
A. Preliminaries
Formally, we assume that there is a population of non-
cooperative individuals, where the dynamics of resources
yi(t) of each individual i at time t follow a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM),
dyi = yi (µdt+ σdWi) , (1)
with µ being the drift term, σ the noise amplitude,
and dWi is an independent Wiener increment, Wi(t) =∫ t
0
dWi. Without noise (σ = 0), the model is simply ex-
ponential growth at rate µ. With σ 6= 0 it can be inter-
preted as exponential growth with a fluctuating growth
rate.
The advantage of modelling through GBM lies in its
universality, as it represents an attractor of more com-
plex models that exhibit multiplicative growth [26, 27].
Its non-ergodicity manifests as the difference between the
growth rate observed in an individual trajectory and the
ensemble average growth [12, 13]. In particular, the es-
timator for the growth rate, gi(yi(t), t), of a single GBM
trajectory is defined as
gi(yi(t), t) =
1
t
log
(
yi(t)
yi(0)
)
, (2)
where yi(0) is the initial condition. For simplicity, we
assume yi(0) = 1.
The time-averaged growth rate is found by letting time
remove the stochasticity in the process, i.e., taking the
limit as t→∞, which results in
lim
t→∞ gi(yi(t), t) = µ−
σ2
2
. (3)
The ensemble growth rate, on the other hand, is found
by substituting yi(t) with the average 〈y〉 of an infinite
ensemble, where 〈·〉 is the averaging operation. In other
words, one lets the spatial dimension remove the stochas-
ticity by averaging across all possible realizations. Math-
ematically, the solution is
lim
N→∞
gi(〈y〉, t) = µ, (4)
where N is the ensemble size.
If only a single system is to be modeled, in steady
state only the time-averaged growth rate, Eq. (3), is ob-
served. As discussed in [12], the ensemble average growth
rate (4) is fictive, as it assumes averaging over “imag-
ined parallel universes”. Hence, in reality, it is the time-
averaged growth rate that determines the evolutionary
performance of an individual GBM trajectory. Simul-
taneously, it provides parallels to real-life phenomena.
For instance, in evolutionary games the time-averaged
growth rate is the geometric mean fitness for the accu-
mulated payoff (resources) of a particular phenotype [28].
In economic decision theory, where wealth (resources) dy-
namics follows a multiplicative process, the same growth
observable arises naturally as the unique utility mea-
sure [13].
B. Pooling and sharing of resources
From an evolutionary perspective, individuals with
lower noise amplitude should exhibit higher steady state
growth rates and should thus be favored. In this re-
gard, pooling and sharing may constitute a fundamental
mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in well-mixed
fluctuating environments since it has been found that it
reduces the uncertainties in future growth and, hence,
brings closer the observed growth rate to the ensemble
value [16–18]. For GBM dynamics, this has been nicely
evidenced in [18].
Concretely, the pooling and sharing mechanism can be
described as follows. A mutation introduces cooperative
3dynamics in a population ofN individuals whose resource
growth is given by a GBM trajectory. In a discretized
version of (1), after a period of growth, the individuals
pool their resources and subsequently share them equally,
resulting in the following dynamics for the resources
dy = y
(
µdt+
σ√
N
dW
)
. (5)
In (5) the subscript i has been dropped due to the
equal sharing and dW = 1√
N
∑
i dWi represents the
pooled Wiener increment. Evidently, equation (5) is a
GBM with an amplitude of σ/
√
N , thus yielding a time-
averaged growth of
gi(yi(t), t) = µ− σ
2
2
1
N
. (6)
Notice that as the number of cooperating individuals
increases, the time-averaged growth rate converges to the
ensemble average growth. This implies that in finite pop-
ulations, the introduction of new individuals always pro-
duces a net performance gain. As a result, one may con-
jecture that the evolution of group formation and simple
multicellularity, where a class of non-cooperating unicel-
lular species mutates to a new trait capable of forming
multicellular organisms, could be a consequence of the
fact that larger number of cooperators in a fluctuating
environment effectively enhances the growth rate (or re-
duces the drift) [29, 30]. Similar analogy may hold at
higher levels of intelligence. As an illustration, consider
situations where individuals join a community-supported
agriculture to exchange their produced goods for a fixed
basket of products, thereby reducing the risks in farm-
ing [31]. Another example are nations joining unions
to assure sustainable economic growth through common
goals [32]. However, being a model of unconstrained mul-
tiplicative growth, GBM has limitations when modeling
additive environments or circumstances where growth op-
portunities are limited due to resource or spatial con-
straints.
C. Networked GBM
Real-life interactions between individuals are, however,
seldom realized in a well-mixed structure, and are instead
driven by a complex network of contacts [6]. To model
this situation, we characterize each individual i with par-
ticipation in di pools. In a discretized version of the
model, each round t begins with a growth phase where
the resources yi(t) of i grow to y¯i(t + dt). The growth
phase is followed by a cooperation phase where each indi-
vidual pools an equal fraction of its resources in each of
the pools it belongs to. Afterwards, each pool returns an
equal fraction of the pooled resources to each individual.
The resulting mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The interaction structure is modeled by a connected
bipartite random graph B between finite sets N of N
FIG. 1. Networked GBM with pooling and sharing of
resources. The resources of three individuals grow according
to GBM and after that they are pooled in n and m. Finally,
the pools distribute the pooled resources equally among its
participants. For visualization purposes we set dt = 1.
individuals andM ofM pools, with binary edge variables
Bim ∈ {0, 1} between pairs of individuals i ∈ N and
pools m ∈ M (Bim = 1, indicating participation of i in
pool m). The bipartite representation offers a principled
way of capturing wider information regarding the group
composition and network interactions [8]. In this regard,
the model can be related to games of public goods played
on networks, with the main difference that in our model
the growth of resources of each individual precedes the
pooling phase [8, 9, 33][34].
By setting dt→ 0, the dynamics can be explained as
dyi =

 N∑
j
Aijyj − yi

dt+
N∑
j
Aijyj (µdt+ σdWj) ,
(7)
where A represents a transition matrix of the network
with entries Aij =
∑M
m
Bim
dm
Bjm
dj
determining the to-
tal allocated resources from individual j to individual
i. Equation (7) resembles the Bouchaud–Mezard wealth
reallocation model [35–38], with the note that now the
reallocation happens after the growth phase.
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
A. Time-averaged growth rate
For tractability, we proceed by examining a discrete
version of equation (7),
yi(t+∆t) =
∑
j
Aijyj(t)
[
1 + µ∆t+ σεj(t)
√
∆t
]
, (8)
where εj(t) is a random variable following the standard
Gaussian distribution, and utilize a mean-field approach.
4For this purpose, we define two variables. First, the
grown resources of each individual i are given as
y¯i(t+∆t) = yi(t)
[
1 + µ∆t+ σεi(t)
√
∆t
]
,
For large t the time-averaged growth rate of this variable
should be the same as gi(yi(t), t) as its value will be dom-
inated by yi(t). Second, we define the mean-field around
individual i as the average grown resources of each of its
neighbors weighted by their contributions to i, i.e.,
〈y¯i〉 =
∑
j Aij y¯j∑
j Aij
.
By combining the last two equations and adapting the
time scale such that ∆t = 1, the growth of i can be
approximated as
gi(yi(t), t) =
log(
∑
j Aij)
t
+
log(〈y¯i〉)
t
. (9)
Two implications arise from equation (9). First, in the
transient regime there is an additive term in the growth
rate which is solely dependent on the network structure.
Hence, during this regime, individuals which are better
connected in terms of
∑
j Aij should have faster growth
rates. The second observation is that the second term
on the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (9) eventually
converges to the same value for each individual. This is
because we study a connected graph where participation
in a pool implies that there is a path between any pair
of individuals. Due to this interconnectedness, we ex-
pect that the steady state time-averaged growth of each
〈y¯i〉 will be dominated by the growth of the wealthiest
individual in the network.
The convergence of the growth rates between individu-
als provides a direct equivalence with the time-averaged
growth rate g(〈y〉N , t) = d log(〈y〉N )dt , which is derived from
the partial ensemble average 〈y〉N . This object is con-
structed from all individuals present in the network. As
a consequence, one can use Itoˆ’s lemma to directly calcu-
late the time-averaged growth rate in the network. For-
mally, the lemma states that the differential of an arbi-
trary one-dimensional function f(y, t) governed by an Itoˆ
drift-diffusion process (such as equation (7)), is given by
df(y, t) =
∂f
∂t
dt+
∑
i
∂f
∂yi
dyi +
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
∂2f
∂yi∂yj
dyidyj .
(10)
In the case of g(〈y〉N , t), we have that f(t,y) =
log(〈y〉N ). Then, the first and second derivative of f with
respect to yi and yj are easily calculated as
∂f
∂yi
= 1
N
1
〈y〉N
and ∂
2f
∂yi∂yj
= − 1
N2
1
〈y〉2
N
, [39]. Moreover, this transfor-
mation makes the differential df(y, t) ergodic, and since
we are looking at steady state averages, dyi and dyidyj
can be substituted with their expected values 〈dyi〉 and
〈dyidyj〉. To estimate these expectations we utilize the
independent Wiener increment property 〈dW 2i 〉 = dt,
and make use of the fact that
∑
k Akj = 1. Further,
we omit terms of order dt2 as they are negligible. As a
result, we obtain that 〈dyi〉 =
[
(1 + µ)
∑
j Aijyj − yi
]
dt
and 〈dyidyj〉 = σ2dt
∑
k AikAjky
2
k. By inserting the es-
timates in equation (10) we can approximate the time-
averaged growth rate as
g(〈y〉N , t) = µ− σ
2
2
〈yˆ2〉N
N
, (11)
where yˆi = yi/〈y〉N are the rescaled resources of individ-
ual i. This is a dimensionless quantity which compares
the endowment of resources of an individual with the
population average and as such has been particularly use-
ful in analyses related to wealth inequality [35]. In fact,
equation (11) indicates that the variance of the rescaled
resources 〈yˆ2〉N dictates the time-averaged growth rate.
Under this model, networks with larger resource inequal-
ity, i.e. higher 〈yˆ2〉N , are expected to have lower steady
state growth rates than those where the resources are
distributed more equally.
Additional technical details which suggest the usage of
the growth rate of the partial ensemble average g(〈y〉N , t)
as the growth rate of each individual is provided in the
Appendix.
B. Steady-state behavior
When deriving the individual growth rate we utilized
a steady state property of the system. Such properties
are key to understanding the role of complex networks
within the pooling and sharing mechanism. In particu-
lar, notice that in the limit we can substitute the product
of yj(t) and the exponential of (11) for each y¯j(t + ∆t),
divide both sides of the equation by the population aver-
age resources and conclude that the steady state rescaled
resources of individual i are
lim
t→∞ yˆi(t) = vi. (12)
where vi is the i-th element of the right-eigenvector of
A associated with the largest eigenvalue normalized in
a way such that
∑
i vi = N . A direct corollary is the
equilibrium individual growth rate
lim
t→∞ gi(yi(t), t) = µ−
σ2
2
〈v2〉
N
. (13)
We emphasize that the quantity on the RHS of equa-
tion (13) is always greater than µ − σ2/2. This can
be concluded by examining the optimization problem of
maximizing 〈v2〉 constrained on ∑i vi = N , and noting
that the global maximum is always less than N . There-
fore a network of pooling and sharing individuals on the
long run will always outperform non-cooperating GBM
trajectories. While this indicates that cooperation is a
5dominant trait in the population, it also asserts that, de-
pending on the distribution of v, pooling and sharing may
produce societies where the distribution of resources dif-
fers to a great extent from the one observed in individual
trajectories [40].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Settings
In the numerical analysis we compare the simulated
dynamics of the discrete version of the networked GBM,
as described with Eq. (8), with the analytical results pre-
sented in the previous section. Due to the fact that we
can only simulate for finite amount of time and as a con-
sequence may fail to completely remove the stochasticity,
we construct partial ensemble averages by averaging the
results across 100 realizations of pooling and sharing.
To make the analysis simpler, we formulate the in-
teractions by considering each individual to also be a
pool through which its (direct) neighbors share resources.
This results in a bipartite graph where the average degree
〈d〉N between individuals is equal to the average degree
between pools 〈d〉M, i.e. 〈d〉N = 〈d〉M = 〈d〉. Fig. 2
depicts the process of mapping the original undirected
random graph to a directed replacement graph, via a bi-
partite graph representation which models the pooling
and sharing mechanism. The edges in the replacement
graph capture the elements Aij in the transition matrix
A.
The evaluation of the model properties is done on
four types of random graphs: random d-regular graph
(RR) [21], Erdos-Renyi Poisson graph (ER) [22], Watts-
Strogatz small-world network (WS) [23] and Barabasi-
Albert scale-free network (BA) [24]. To capture the rep-
resentative graph of each random graph that we study, for
each random graph type we average the results across 100
realizations. Moreover, to distinguish the performance
of the model in graphs of different size we analyze the
model on both small graphs (N = 10) and large graphs
(N = 100).
B. Experiments
To evaluate the performance of the model under dif-
ferent graph settings we conduct three experiments.
Experiment 1. In the first experiment we examine the
transient behavior and the convergence properties of the
derived growth rate as described with Eq. (9). The re-
sults for small and large networks are respectively given
in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b. Even though we observe that there
are some discrepancies at the beginning of the simulation
for each graph type an size, eventually the analytical and
the numerical growth rate converge to the same value.
This result holds for both small and large networks and
for each random graph type, thus suggesting the plausi-
bility of our conjecture for the convergence of the growth
rate.
Experiment 2. The second experiment compares the
distribution of the rescaled resources in steady state,
Pyˆ(yˆ), among the graphs. Samples of the correspond-
ing probability density functions (PDFs) are depicted in
Fig. 4. Fig. 4a shows the results for small graphs while in
Fig. 4b the corresponding results for large random graphs
are provided. For both graph sizes, we notice the agree-
ment between the analytical solution in (12) (the value of
vi) and the simulated rescaled resources, yˆi. In addition,
independently of the graph size, we observe that the RR
graph exhibits no inequality across the resources (point
mass PDF), whereas the distributions of the rescaled re-
sources in ER and WS graphs have exponential tails. Fi-
nally, the distribution of the rescaled resources in the BA
graph resembles a fat tail, i.e. the resources of the indi-
viduals exhibit larger variances. As a consequence, the
BA graph has the lowest steady state growth rate, fol-
lowed by ER and WS, as depicted in the inset plots in
Fig. 4. This acts as a confirmation for our second ana-
lytical finding that steady state growth rate of Eqs. (7)
and (8) is uniquely determined by the variance of the
right eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue
of the network transition matrix A.
Experiment 3. The last experiment investigates the
role of network sparsity (measured through the average
degree 〈d〉), on the resource distribution. In this respect,
it relates the analytical predictions described by Eq. (11)
with the numerical solutions of Eqs. (7) and (8). Fig. 5
depicts the variance of rescaled resources 〈yˆ2〉 as a func-
tion of 〈d〉, for small (Fig. 5a) and large graphs (Fig. 5b).
Moreover, the inset plots give the ratio of the individ-
ual growth rate and the drift parameter, as a function of
the same variable. For both graph sizes we observe that
denser ER, WS and BA graphs yield more equal resource
distribution compared to their respectively sparser coun-
terparts, whereas in the RR graph the resource distri-
bution is invariant to the average degree. As illustrated,
there is an alignment between the numerical and the the-
oretical results for the variance of the rescaled resources
both across and within graph types. We note the slight
difference between the observed (numerically obtained)
growth rate and the analytical solution which, we argue,
is due to the fact that the simulations run for a finite
amount of steps.
V. DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that interactions on complex net-
works in a fluctuating environment play a critical role
in the observed time-averaged growth rates and resource
distribution, both in transient regime and in steady state.
The cooperation dynamics is dictated by the properties
of the underlying bipartite graph which models the net-
work interactions in the pooling and sharing mechanism.
6FIG. 2. Graph representation. (a) Example of a random graph with 5 individuals. (b) The bipartite representation
modeling interactions in a pooling-sharing game, as used in the numerical experiments. (c) The replacement graph capturing
effective reallocation of resources between the individuals. The edges are the non-zero elements of the transition matrix A, as
in equation (8). (d) The transition matrix A.
FIG. 3. Transient regime dynamics. Individual growth rate dynamics for sample RR, ER, BA and WS graphs, for (a)
small and (b) large networks. Filled lines represent simulated values while the dashed lines are the analytical solutions of the
individual growth rate. The GBM parameters are set to µ = 0.3 and σ2 = 0.4. The results are averaged across 100 realizations
of pooling and sharing processes with each graph each having an average degree 〈d〉 = 5.
A startling example is the dynamics taking place on a
BA scale-free graph, where largest discrepancies between
the individual growth-rates are observed in the transient
regime, as compared to ER, WS and RR graphs. Fur-
thermore, the BA graph has the smallest time-averaged
growth once the equilibrium is reached, and the most
unequal resource distribution. From an evolutionary per-
spective, a network structure which presents with lower
time-averaged growth may be interpreted as being less
supportive to cooperation. It is intriguing whether there
is any relationship between the apparent lower propen-
sity to cooperation of BA scale-free networks (under the
here considered interaction model) and the recent empir-
ical evidence regarding the low-prevalence (i.e. rarity) of
scale-free networks in nature [41, 42].
As a takeaway, we conclude that inequality may arise
as a result of the interwoven relationship between com-
plex networks and cooperative dynamics in fluctuating
environments. While it is known that certain network
topologies promote inequality [24, 43], the effect of co-
operative behavior in structured populations is still to
be determined [44–46]. As such, our investigations aim
at providing deeper understanding on the nature of the
relationship between these two occurrences.
Besides providing a basic model of self-reproducing
living entities with temporal fluctuations, multiplica-
tive processes are also excessively used to model self-
financing investments [47], gambles [13] and wealth al-
location [35, 37]. In this respect, our findings may pro-
vide insights to economic utility theory with applica-
tions to finance, portfolio management, risk-evaluation
and decision-making. In addition, they contribute to the
ongoing discussions in economics and econophysics re-
garding the potential negative effects of wealth inequal-
ity on economic growth and development [35, 48] and on
the individual well-being in general.
7FIG. 4. Steady state distribution of resources. Estimated PDF for the rescaled resources for four different types of
random graphs – RR, ER, WS and BA, each having an average degree 〈d〉 = 5. (a) Results for small graphs (N = 10). (b)
Results for large graphs (N = 100). The inset plots depict the ratio of the estimated growth rate and the drift parameter for the
same graphs. Filled lines represent the simulated values while the dashed lines are the analytical solutions of the corresponding
variables. In the simulation µ = 0.3 and σ2 = 0.4. For each graph type, the results are averaged across 100 realizations.
FIG. 5. Network sparsity and steady state resource distribution. The variance of rescaled resources as a function of
the average degree 〈d〉 for four different types of random graphs – RR, ER, WS and BA. (a) Results for small graphs (N = 10).
(b) Results for large graphs (N = 100). The corresponding gi/µ ratios are depicted in the insets. Filled lines represent the
simulated values while the dashed lines are the analytical solutions of the corresponding variables. In the simulation µ = 0.3
and σ2 = 0.4. For each graph type, the results are averaged across 100 realizations.
A straightforward direction for future work is a sce-
nario where individuals exhibit heterogeneous drifts and
volatilities. There, cooperation is evolutionary advanta-
geous only in certain parameter regimes, and thus one
should investigate the dynamics under a more general
model where individuals are allowed to contribute only
a fraction of their resources to the pool. In this context,
relations to simplistic behavioral rules that model partial
cooperation, e.g. [49, 50], may be of particular relevance.
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8VI. APPENDIX
Here we provide further mathematical logic behind our
intuition to use the growth rate of the partial ensemble
average g(〈y〉N , t) as the growth rate of each individual.
In particular we derive two propositions which describe
the dynamics of the system. The first proposition tells
us that if the rescaled resources of each individual con-
verge to a certain value, then the growth rate of every
individual will also converge to the growth rate of the
partial ensemble average. The second one, on the other
hand, shows that if the growth rate of each individual
converges to the same value, then the rescaled resources
converge to vi.
Proposition 1: If the rescaled wealth of every in-
dividual converges to a certain real value zi, i.e. if
limt→∞ yˆi(t) = zi, with 0 < zi < N , then the steady
state growth rate of each individual converges to the
growth rate of the partial ensemble average g(〈y〉N , t).
Proof: Suppose that limt→∞ yˆi(t) = zi and that the
initial resources yi(0) = 1 for all i, then
lim
t→∞ gi(yi(t), t) = limt→∞
1
t
log
(
yi(t)
yi(0)
)
= lim
t→∞
1
t
log (〈y〉 · zi)
= lim
t→∞
1
t
log (〈y〉) + lim
t→∞
1
t
log (zi)
= lim
t→∞
1
t
log (〈y〉N )
.
= lim
t→∞ g(〈y〉N , t).
Proposition 2: If the steady state growth rate of
each individual converges to the same value, i.e. if
limt→∞ gi(yi(t), t) = g for all i, then the steady state
rescaled resources of individual i, yˆi is given by vi, where
vi is the i-th element of the right-eigenvector of A associ-
ated with the largest eigenvalue and normalized in a way
such that
∑
i vi = N .
Proof: Suppose that limt→∞ gi(yi(t), t) = g. Then by
dividing equation (8) with the average resources 〈y(t +
∆t) in period t+∆t, for the discrete version of the model
it follows that:
lim
t→∞ yˆi(t+∆t) = limt→∞
∑
j Aijyj(t)
[
1 + µ∆t+ σ
√
∆t
]
(1 + g) · 〈y(t)〉
≈ lim
t→∞
∑
j
Aij yˆj(t).
The last expression gives a Markov chain for which it is
widely known that the stationary distribution is given
by the right-eigenvector of A associated with the largest
eigenvalue [51], where its entries vi are normalized in a
way such that
∑
i vi = N .
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